The purposes o f providing just compensation to victims o f medical injury and assur ing high quality medical care are not served by the tort system. The tinkering with the tort system following the 1975 malpractice crisis will not ease the constantly increas ing cost burden on the health care delivery system. Costs will double every three to four years. The only answer is a social insurance approach. The costs of a compensa tion system for medical injury regardless offault could be met by eliminating the fric tion costs o f the tort system, and would be helped by establishing national health in surance. The system could be initiated gradually and would be accompanied by quality assurance measures. 
was not, in 675 cases res ipsa loquitur was alleged, against 8,197 in which it was not. Lack of informed consent was alleged in 1,169 cases and not claimed in 7,716 cases.
These figures would appear to indicate a higher percentage of consent problems than reported elsewhere, but, as previously stated, inclusion of this allegation in a Bill of Particulars does not necessari ly mean that it was actually a factor in the determination of a settle ment or an award.
While the question of informed consent may not be the decisive factor in malpractice verdicts, it may, with the rise of consumerism, be a significant factor in the institution of claims and suits. Since a very large percentage of malpractice costs consists of claims and legal expenses, it may well be that attempts to limit the physician's responsibility for informed consent may in fact proliferate malprac tice claims because the patient feels he was not informed of the risks and alternative treatments at the time of surgery.
It should be noted that according to a report by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1975: 349) there are few cases in New York which revolve around informed consent and no signifi cant evidence that limitation on informed consent helps to reduce premiums. The New York Commission (New York . . ., 1976: 37-38) concurs in the view that the problem of informed consent, despite frequent statements to the contrary, did not play any signifi cant role in generating the malpractice problem, nor will any laws to limit informed consent help with the solution of the problem.
The contingent-fee system has also been frequently cited as a cause of the malpractice crisis. The Secretary's Commission (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [DHEW], 1973: 32, 33, 50) did not support this view and found that the average hourly costs for the plaintiffs attorneys were only slightly higher than those for defense attorneys. Of course the fact that defense and plaintiffs' hourly rates are comparable does not mean that the tort system, with or without contingency-fee arrangements, achieves the objective of compensating injury and achieving competent, perfor mance.
One argument in favor of contingent fees is that they enable poor people to bring cases they otherwise would not. This conten tion was accepted by the Secretary's Commission but is challenged by the New York State Panel (New York . . ., 1976:42) which found Fall 1976 / Health and Society / M M F Q that "a party with a good claim of under $2 0 ,0 0 0 will have difficulty in finding an experienced malpractice attorney to take his case." Thus the size of the claim rather than the affluence or poverty of the claimant seems to be the determining factor. There will perhaps be some tendency to reduce large settlements by limiting contingent fees at the upper levels, and a number of states and judicial systems have adopted limitations on contingency fees that lower the percen tage of the fee as the amount of the award or settlement rises. The theory behind this is that if the plaintiffs lawyer's fee does not rise proportionately with the size of the settlement, he will be less likely to hold out for larger amounts. Nine states enacted legislation along this line in 1975. It remains to be seen what effect this will have, but the New York Panel (1976) feels that, unlike most new legislation, this might have some slight effect on malpractice premiums, since large settlements do modify the average payment significantly.
Limitation on damages for pain and suffering has also been proposed as a partial solution, and this would undoubtedly limit very large awards with a consequent reduction of the average pay ment.
The collateral source rule has also been suggested as increasing malpractice awards. According to this rule, the fact that the plaintiff is insured for many of the costs for which he has been damaged is in admissible as court evidence. Hence, for example, Medicare, Social Security, Disability Payments, Workmen's Compensation Benefits, Veterans Benefits, Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and other health-plan income continue to go to the plaintiff so that he is paid doubly by be ing awarded damages covering the same costs for which he is in sured. The American Insurance Association (New York . . ., 1976: 183) estimates that a dollar-for-dollar reduction of collateral sources could reduce premiums by 10 to 15 percent. Abolition of the Collateral source rule was advocated by the New York City Bar As sociation Report (Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1975: 336, 350).
Large demands for damages, now often going over $1 billion, have brought the suggestion that the ad damnum clause (the amount claimed for damages) should be eliminated. Since the media do not usually report the final results, the most frequent of which is no award, it has been stated that the elimination of the ad damnum clause would tend to discourage frivolous malpractice suits. While it is dubious whether elimination of this clause would reduce pre miums, there seems to be significant support for ending the irritant.
Suggested Insurance Causes
Because of the long time which elapses between the filing of the claim and the settlement, insurance companies have been able to charge low premiums, with the possibility of investing the premiums and earning considerable income before the actual payout was necessary. Thus, while there may have been in the past high insurance company profits, inefficiencies in claims handling, and other defects, the increase in actual payments has been substantial and the very large increase in premiums that occurred in 1975 is a reflection of the trends described above and fears of the unknown, because of the "long tail."
Sociological Causes
It has been suggested that the decline in prestige, status, and venera tion of physicians has encouraged proliferation of malpractice suits Increased malpractice publicity has also been suggested as heightening the public's awareness of the possibility of obtaining large awards as reported in newspapers. Administrative experience with malpractice problems for a group of hospitals in New York City shows that there was a sudden large increase in claims follow ing the publicity about malpractice in 1975, and quite specifically, a rash of suits on retrolental fibroplasia following a large award in such a case which received much newspaper publicity.
Advances in technology have also undoubtedly contributed to the situation. Here again, while no studies are available, experience of New York hospitals shows a high frequency of cases relating to open-heart surgery, where the problems with the heart-lung pump can produce suits of considerable seriousness, obviously impossible before this device was introduced.
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What are the real issues in the malpractice cirsis? In immediate terms the availability and cost of malpractice insurance and the proliferation of suits appear to be the problem, but the fundamental issue is how to guarantee high-quality medical care and to compen sate patients for medical injuries.
Those who deal with the surface issue of premiums and increase in suits are caught in a dilemma of legislation that is unfair to patients when it limits their right to sue and the amount of damages they can collect, while costs escalate.
The Quality Issue
Let us start with the quality question, since the present system is supposed to assure quality; in any case it is the intended social goal of the system. Present mechanisms for supervising and auditing the quality of medical care are clearly inadequate. Proposals to improve them through PSROs have been fought by providers (Gosfield, 1975 In other words, a basic cause of the malpractice crisis is malpractice-i.e., poor medical care.
The DHEW studies, American College of Surgeons studies, and the Cornell study all undercut the argument of defenders of the tort system that it is the best way to provide compensation for those injured. It is clear from the numbers of injured involved that, despite the publicity concerning substantial awards, many patients are ac tually not compensated. Apart from claims never brought, studies of the allocation of the malpractice premium dollar indicate only a small portion goes to the patient (New York . . ., 1976: 250).
It will clearly be difficult to compromise all of the conflicting interests in the area of medical negligence, when the livelihood of lawyers, doctors, and insurance company managers and employees can be so seriously affected.
The lives and health of patients must, however, be the central concern of society.
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The existing system does not protect the health of patients ade quately.
The resistance of physicians to adequate controls and discipline means that poor care by physicians and hospitals continues. The tort system does not rectify poor care. The result of all this is rising patient dissatisfaction expressed in increasing numbers of malprac tice suits.
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The Organization and Financing Issue
Apart from the lack of quality controls in the existing system, its organization is inadequate so that in many parts of the country there are not enough physicians and/or specialists. Furthermore, the solo practice mechanism does not provide patients with adequate refer rals to specialists when appropriate. The way American health care is delivered also means that the poor and middle class receive inadequate care because of their in ability to pay for good care. These defects in our health care delivery system have been frequently documented (Fuchs, 1974; Klaw, 1975) .
All of these factors-poor quality control, poor organization, i t and inadequate financing combine to create a large number of angry l patients who sue doctors and hospitals. Even in cases where the ; patient has coverage or can pay for medical care, if his costs insi crease because of a poor medical result, he is angry at having to pay if the additional expense. j The growing number of malpractice suits is simply one j* manifestation of the dissatisfaction with the financing, organization, and quality controls of the whole medical care system. Apart from the suggested tort law changes already dealt with, a number of other proposals should be mentioned. A demand by physicians for a legislative definition of medical malpractice was heavily pushed during the New York crisis. This would actually have no effect on the settlements or awards (New York . . ., 1976: 33) unless the legislative definition provided for compensation to be granted only in cases of gross negligence, as outlined in most good Samaritan statutes. Such a gross negligence definition would, however, be clearly unfair to the patient. Most tort law changes are suggested as ways of cutting costs at the expense of equity for the patient.
For the society at large, as is pointed out in the New York report, the tort system increases the cost of health care as a result of the high insurance costs and the practice of defensive medicine. The tort system also delays introduction of improvements in the delivery of health care because of the threat of malpractice claims.
In summary, the only proposed tort law changes that seem like ly to affect the size of awards and eventually of malpractice premiums would be elimination of the collateral source rule and es tablishment of a limitation on pain-and-suffering awards. Proposals to limit the total amount of damages appear to be of doubtful con stitutionality besides being unfair to the patient. There is no reason why the malpractice crisis should be viewed solely as a problem of Essentially, proposals to improve the tort system, to provide screening panels or to institute binding arbitration would diminish the protection that the system now gives those patients who are able to use it successfully. But such proposals would not help the large number of patients who now receive no compensation for medical injuries even though these are the result of negligence.
(3) National Health Insurance: Since the malpractice crisis
Fall 1976 / Health and Society / M M F Q derives from the defects in the basic health delivery system, it will n ot be solved without a major change in that system. The enactment ô f a system of national health insurance would remove a major port ion of the causes of the malpractice problem.
Medical care for all conditions would be provided, regardless of ?)c the cause of the condition. There would be less inclination to sue in ŝ uch a situation. The smaller number of suits in countries with national health insurance or national health services is certainly causally related to the availability of those benefits. There would have to be no separate system to compensate those medically in jured for their medical costs. The lack of itemized malpractice awards in most of our judicial system makes it difficult to assess what portion of the total national malpractice bill would be eliminated if medical costs were not included, and if only loss of earnings together with a limited amount for pain and suffering were to remain either in the tort/liability insurance system or alternative systems. In any case, subtracting medical costs from the total would be a substantial gain. Under national health insurance, the organization and quality control in the system would both be improved, since problems of distribution, referral systems, group practice, and other organizational defects of the present system could be remedied. Quality controls and disciplinary measures could be built into the system. Under the present system, quality controls, insofar as they exist, are mostly based on doctors controlling themselves, which in any other area would be unacceptable (Sidel, 1975; Gosfield, 1975) . Even the Professional Service Review Organization system, which was scheduled to be initiated in January 1976, has been delayed by opposition from physicians. The effective date as a result has been postponed to January 1978. Only half of the PSRO services areas have planning or conditional contracts because of resistance from the professionals.
A national health insurance system and, even more, a national health service would thus be a major step toward resolving the com pensation and quality issues.
(4) Social Insurance (No Fault): A patient who suffers an adverse medical outcome should be compensated through a system of social insurance providing benefits for all losses due to medical injuries beyond those covered by national health insurance. The Workmen's Compensation system could be a partial model for such a system. It should not be necessary to spend five to 10 years under a tort system to prove that a doctor made a mistake in order for a patient to receive compensation.
For example, some medical injuries occur because of high-risk procedures. A young attorney concerned with health law recently suggested to me that such procedures should be prohibited or severely limited, since they impose on the insurance system unneces-sary burdens, even if the doctor is willing to risk his professional reputation and the patient knowingly consents to the high risk of medical injury.
The value of the human lives saved through attempting (and therefore often improving) high-risk procedures such as open-heart surgery in my view outweighs such arguments. Society does gain and has mechanisms for dealing with those experiments which do not succeed (e.g., the dramatic drop in heart-transplant attempts).
It is obviously desirable to develop a detailed plan for the implementation of a compensation/social insurance approach to medical injury. It should be noted that such an approach was adopted into law in New Zealand on April 1, 1974. As a result, any personal injury from accident, under any circumstances, is covered. One of the criticisms of a social insurance approach to medical injury is the assumption that it would involve an enormous cost. Claims of high cost for social insurance are based on the assump tion, however, that all medical injuries would be immediately sub sumed under the system, together with all of the faults of the fault system. Furthermore, there has been no study of the total social cost of the existing system, including the costs of the judicial system. Malpractice premium expenses are by no means the only cost item in the tort system.
The DHEW study points out that such a system might deal solely with compensation limited to special damages (costs in curred, future costs, and loss of income) or that it could also include general damages (pain and suffering, loss of consortium). In fact the study indicates there are a total of 432 modes in the models it ex amines. It further points out that while predictability is almost non existent within the tort approach, the outcome of a social insurance system can be predicted within statistical limits such that feedback mechanisms which have not been available within the tort/liability approach, could be installed in a social insurance system. Among the disadvantages of the fault system which would be It should be noted that the estimates of payouts to the patients in the malpractice tort system represent a percentage of premiums only and not a percentage of the total social cost, including the costs of the judicial system.
In the pioneering paper of Havighurst and Tancredi (1973: 125) a possibility of high premium costs in a no-fault insurance scheme is thought likely, but felt to be compensated by reduced social costs. While the actual cost remains to be seen when the system is implemented, my own view is that no great risk need be assumed: a social insurance system could be initiated step by step, starting in with a specific list of compensable injuries as suggested by Havighurst and Tancredi and broadening out as experience is gained.
Administrative costs in the social insurance system, predicted to be high by its opponents, would in fact be much lower than those in the tort law/liability system (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare [DHEW], 1973: appendix 471). The tort law/liability system costs are high because of the fragmented nature of the system and because of the need on the part of the insurance com panies to anticipate claims whose tails are long.
A social insurance system could be adopted in the United States on a state-wide or national basis. It would be initiated by pay ment by physicians and hospitals of a fixed premium which would be later subjected to merit rating as in Workmen's Compensation. In this way, those providers who had a higher incidence of claims would pay the highest fee.
Administration would be by a commission including physi cians, attorneys, and laymen. Examiners would screen claims, hold hearings, and report to a referee for a decision in accordance with a compensation schedule. Appeals could be taken to a review panel, with a final decision resting with the commission. Thus, the Medical Injury Compensation Commission would function like any ad ministrative tribunal with mechanisms similar to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, or the Workmen's Compensa tion Commission. Resort to the legal system would be permitted only on procedural matters, not amount of awards. The compensa tion schedule would provide for a limitation on awards for pain and suffering.
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We have seen that the tort/liability system does not serve either of its two main purposes: providing compensation to injured patients or assuring the high quality of medical care. The mechanisms for providing proper compensation to victims under a social insurance system have been outlined above. We have also given some indication of an approach to ensuring high quality of medical care. Some element of the responsibility contained in the tort system would be carried forward by establishing premiums sub ject to merit rating based on experience. This would fix monetary rewards for good experience and penalties for bad experience.
In addition to this, since we would be dealing with a social in surance system established by statute, there would be no difficulty in building-in requirements for audit and tight hospital-staff organiza tion, which have a demonstrable relationship with lower malpractice incidence. Delineation of privileges, so that physicians operate only within their spheres of competence, would be part of the system. Continued review of competence could also be included in the system, which would make possible more complete reporting of claims and awards than we now have under the tort system. Based on the information that would be available in a social insurance system, measures to deal with physicians found to be of lower com petence could involve as a first step a requirement that certain educational courses be taken and appropriate examinations passed; for more serious cases, licenses could be suspended with a require ment of performance under close supervision in a hospital or other structured setting. Cancellation of license would be reserved for the most severe cases.
C o n c lu sio n
The next step is the initiation of a social insurance system for medical injuries on either a state or national basis. We believe this is practical fiscally. It would eliminate the friction costs in the present tort system and convert them to benefits in the compensation system. We also believe that the plan could be developed gradually,
